REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 28-04-2008	2. REPORT TYPE FINAL	3. DATES COVERED (From - To)

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE WHO'S IN CHARGE HERE? CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
	5b. GRANT NUMBER
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) ROBERT LOUGHRAN Paper Advisor (if Any): IVAN LUKE	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
	5e. TASK NUMBER
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Joint Military Operations Department Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
For Example: Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES A paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.

14. ABSTRACT

Recent humanitarian assistance/disaster relief missions highlight the challenges of coordinating with non-military agencies and demonstrate that U.S. military participation in these missions is best suited to a first-responder mindset. To enable this limited but essential role, the military and NGOs must improve in areas of information sharing and coordination at the operational-tactical level. Civil-military experience gained during HA/DR mission can also improve interaction in other scenarios and contribute to improving security at the theater-strategic level.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Humanitarian Assistance; Disaster Relief; Civil-military coordination

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Chairman, JMO Dept
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED		25	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 401-841-3556

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

WHO'S IN CHARGE HERE?
CIVIL-MILITARY COORDINATION IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

by

Robert Loughran

LCDR, USN

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____

23 April 2008

Table of Contents

Abstract

Recent humanitarian assistance/disaster relief missions highlight the challenges of coordinating with non-military agencies and demonstrate that U.S. military participation in these missions is best suited to a first-responder mindset. To enable this limited but essential role, the military and NGOs must improve in areas of information sharing and coordination at the operational-tactical level. Civil-military experience gained during HA/DR mission can also improve interaction in other scenarios and contribute to improving security at the theater-strategic level.

Introduction

As war fighters, we spend much of our career studying the art and tactics of employing overwhelming force. Most of our training is designed to prepare us for the rigors of war, to educate us on enemy capabilities and tactics, and to integrate our units into a joint, technologically superior force that dominates in any conflict. The capabilities that enable that dominance come at a high cost, but ensure our primacy as the most powerful fighting force in history. This ability to wield hard power helped achieve victory in the Cold War and enhances our national security today, but its effectiveness is tempered by the realities of globalization and the emergence of transnational threats.

The current global security environment reveals a less tangible conflict than that of previous generations. Described as a war of ideas, the United States is engaged in struggles around the world that challenge the fundamental principles of democratic society. It is important that the values and ideals that make our nation strong are communicated and shared with the rest of the world through effective foreign policy. Responding to international crises, building capabilities in other countries, and encouraging and training foreign militaries to a professional standard are in the best interests of U.S. national security. These tools of soft power often have a much greater effect and come at a much cheaper price than combat operations.

The geographic combatant commanders, as key representatives of the U.S. in their respective regions, employ soft power resources to shape regional security and preclude the commitment of forces in combat. They seek to enhance stability by averting crises or minimizing their impact where possible. Gen Tony Zinni, USMC (Ret.) described his approach to regional security while serving as the commander of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM): "When I … had the ability to choose between fighting fires or preventing

them, I chose prevention. If there was any possible way to make this a less crisis-prone, more secure and stable region, I wanted to try it, through shaping operations." [1]

As a high-visibility example of the military being employed in a soft power role, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) missions have emerged as rewarding operations that are well suited to the capabilities inherent in our military. HA/DR missions have a significant and positive impact on regional security by demonstrating American values, promoting stability in crisis-prone areas, and countering ideological support for terrorism. In this role, the military is necessarily required to integrate in diplomatic and peaceful ways with foreign militaries, other USG agencies, international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). That this occurs is not new, but the frequency and the level of integration are increasing; more than ever, the success of the mission requires successful coordination with these entities. Joint doctrine addresses this issue:

> Difficulties arise from the fact that many USG agencies, civil and military authorities, foreign governments, the UN, NGOs, and IOs share HA responsibilities. US military…planners must remain cognizant that these various agencies usually fall outside the military "command and control" system. Cooperation and coordination are essential in dealing with these organizations. The strategic goals of all concerned may not be identical, or even compatible. However, thorough coordination and planning with all concerned entities can contribute to successful operations in this complex and challenging environment.[2]

This paper examines two recent HA/DR missions--Indian Ocean tsunami relief in 2004 and South Asian earthquake relief in 2005--and the value of U.S. military participation in this type of large-scale sudden-onset disaster. These missions highlight the challenges of coordinating with non-military agencies and demonstrate that U.S. military participation in HA/DR missions is best suited to a first-responder mindset with a focus on relief of immediate, catastrophic suffering, and when appropriate, logistical and security support to non-military personnel. To enable this limited but essential role, the military and NGOs must

improve in areas of information sharing and coordination at the operational-tactical level. Civil-military experience gained during HA/DR missions can also improve interaction in other scenarios, such as reconstruction and peacekeeping missions, where soft power roles for the military continue to emerge.

Humanitarian Assistance Missions

Before examining specific missions, an understanding of what HA missions entail is essential. In joint doctrine, humanitarian assistance is defined as "programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions… that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property."[3] It clarifies that "humanitarian assistance provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration," and is "designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing foreign humanitarian assistance."[4] This definition infers a extensive range of situations in which HA activities can and do take place, but the most visible examples of HA are often disaster relief or support missions that overwhelm fragile governments and more traditional responders such as the United Nations (UN) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

The U.S. government (USG) has an established coordination effort designed to deal with disaster relief efforts around the world. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), according to its website, is "the principal U.S. agency to extend assistance to countries recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms. [It] is an independent federal government agency that receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State."[5] USAID, through its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), has primary responsibility for the U.S. response in

humanitarian assistance operations.[6] OFDA initiates relief operations, including deployment

of Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs), once the U.S. ambassador issues a disaster

declaration, and has authority to coordinate directly with Department of Defense (DOD).[7]

Joint doctrine explains, "OFDA's responsibilities include organizing and coordinating the

total USG…response to a disaster, performing needs assessment, and initiating necessary

procurement of supplies, services, and transportation."[8] The OFDA website describes its

view of military participation in HA/DR missions: "The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD)

possesses unique capabilities that are able to overcome the serious logistical challenges that

often occur following disasters. In collaboration with OFDA, DOD coordinates and directs

the utilization of military assets, including personnel, supplies, and equipment, for

humanitarian assistance overseas." [9]

Operation Unified Assistance

Causing unprecedented devastation, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami thrust military

participation in disaster relief into the headlines and exposed thousands of military and NGO

personnel to the significant challenges inherent in civil-military coordination, magnified by

the complexity of this disaster. U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) responded to the 9.0-

magnitude earthquake and resulting tsunami that struck coastal areas of Southeast Asia on 26

December 2004 by surging available assets and standing up Joint Task Force (JTF)-536 from

elements of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) based in Okinawa. Based on

initial best estimates of the capabilities required for the response, PACOM quickly deployed

forces from around the theater including the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group (CSG-9),

the Bonhomme Richard Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG-5), and multiple land-based

aircraft, which eventually numbered 45.[10] As U.S. Navy P-3s began flying reconnaissance

missions on 29 December to determine the extent of destruction, the first two USPACOM

Disaster Relief Assessment Teams (DRATs) arrived in Sri Lanka and Thailand to begin

evaluating conditions on the ground. A third DRAT arrived the following day in Indonesia.[11]

As commander of III MEF, Lt Gen Robert Blackman, took command of JTF-536 and arrived

in Utapao, Thailand on 2 January 2005. The Combined Coordination Center (CCC) was

established at Utapao as the JTF headquarters and a coordination center for the relief effort.

The following day, JTF-536 was redesignated Combined Support Force (CSF)-536 to reflect

the nature of the mission and the growing list of participants.[12] The DRATs, in each of three

countries requesting assistance, quickly expanded and transitioned to Combined Support

Groups (CSGs), which were assigned responsibility for coordinating efforts with the

governments and militaries of Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Indonesia.

       The scope and nature of the mission, coupled with the sudden onset of the disaster,

mandated that effective multinational, inter-agency cooperation be quickly established while

the CSF was organizing itself and coordinating movements of the sizable military forces

enroute to the region. The CCC mission statement characterized this challenge:

> CSF-536 Combined Co-ordination Centre [sic] will seek to establish the conditions
> that will encourage widespread representation, co-ordination and co-operation across
> the international military and civilian community, avoid operational duplication or
> complication and inform the intentions of single agencies in order to achieve unity of
> effort in the international response to tsunami disaster relief operations across the
> affected region.[13]

The critical role of the CCC in bringing together all of the actors in this crisis was described

by Ralph Cossa, president of the Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International

Studies (CSIS), in a report on tsunami relief logistics:

> The…CCC at Utapao quickly became the heart of the coordinated international relief
> effort, with liaison officers from Australia, Britain, Japan, Thailand, and Singapore,
> along with a Civil-Military Coordination Cell, USAID DART representatives, and a
> local official from the United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian

Affairs (UNOCHA). They met several times a day to coordinate their respective national and institutional efforts. This provided an essential element of on-scene coordination that helped to avoid duplication of effort and facilitated accurate assessments of the extent of the damage and identification of the areas most in need of assistance. The CSF's CCC also helped facilitate the efforts of the international "Core Group" (involving the U.S., Australia, Japan, India, Canada, and others) that was established to coordinate the first stages of the international relief effort, identify and fill gaps, and avoid or break logistical bottlenecks, until the United Nations was able to mobilize and play a more central role in the relief response.[14]

Providing leadership at the tactical level, USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72), was positioned off Aceh province, one of the hardest hit areas on the island of Sumatra, and utilized as a forward helicopter sea base at the heart of the relief effort in Indonesia. The devastation to local infrastructure meant that many non-military organizations relied on the carrier's capabilities to meet their objectives and gain access to victims. Simply trying to understand the scale of the disaster was a challenge. Helicopters from Carrier Air Wing 2 assisted the UN assessment teams traveling around Sumatra, while Lincoln hosted NGO representatives onboard and coordinated with NGO entities ashore to prioritize movement of supplies and personnel. In order to improve information sharing between NGOs and the military, and with each other, the Lincoln set up a management information center in a rented house in Banda Aceh. It had the added benefit of keeping the NGOs aware of local and regional developments, but primarily served to improve efficiency in scheduling helicopter missions requested by the NGOs.[15]

From the outset, PACOM forces assumed a supporting role to the lead federal agency, USAID, and the governments of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Military objectives were focused on coordinating logistical requirements and meeting the needs of the governments affected by the disaster, as well as supporting the growing number of relief agencies. Lt Gen Blackman explained the capabilities he initially coordinated: "rotary-wing aircraft for distribution; water-making, water-production, storage and distribution capability;

some general engineering capability to clear roads and facilitate the relief effort by the host nation or other agencies."[16] Cossa describes the role of the CSGs in Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia, which were headed by one-star officers: "They were there to support host nation-led efforts, but in most instances provided invaluable managerial and coordinating expertise that might otherwise have gone lacking, while augmenting overstretched local assets."[17]

Even as U.S. forces were still arriving in the relief operations area (ROA), commanders began developing an exit strategy, which would require transition criteria for handover of responsibilities to non-military agencies. USPACOM's Execute Order, dated 6 January, included language to that effect in the Commander's Intent: "U.S. forces will limit operations to essential life-sustaining operations and, where feasible, will hand off HA/DR functions to other agencies as soon as practical."[18] Shortly after arriving in Utapao, Lt Gen Blackman verbalized that mindset when he stated: "We will not stay any longer than necessary, and we will…determine when that time is that we can begin to reduce U.S. military capabilities in coordination, in consultation with OFDA and with the U.N. When we believe that they are in a position to…sustain the necessary relief for the affected people, then I will make the recommendation that we begin to incrementally reduce our capability."[19]

The U.S. military, sensitive to Indonesian concerns about an extended presence, completed its mission in less than two months. Describing the handover to relief organizations, Rear Admiral Crowder, CSG-9 commander, said, "We're reaching a point where there's going to be a transition to sustain relief and not an acute emergency got-to-have-it-now relief that we saw in the first couple of weeks."[20] USS Abraham Lincoln ceased operations on 31 January and departed the area on 4 February. At the same time, USNS Mercy arrived on scene to augment medical support of the relief effort, staying on station until 16 March. By the end of January, CSG-Thailand and CSG-Sri Lanka had been

disestablished and on 10 February, CSG-Indonesia disestablished. CSF-536 transitioned

back to a JTF and ceased operations on 24 February. [21]

Operation Unified Assistance was a unique operation that required rapid movement

of U.S. forces over significant distances, support for three different affected nations, and

integration of forces arriving from 15 additional countries.[22] Characterizing the operational

factors involved, Lt Gen Blackman, Commander JTF-536, said, "this has been a unique

military operation…in that we have been planning, assessing, deploying and executing

concurrently. It would be like… if you were taking a family vacation and you were trying to

pack the car and decide where you were going while you were driving down the road."[23]

Operation Lifeline – Pakistan

Another useful example of the critical employment of U.S. military forces in a

humanitarian assistance role occurred when a 7.6-magnitude earthquake struck the Pakistan-

controlled area of Kashmir on 8 October 2005. U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)

directed Rear Admiral Mike LeFever, commanding officer of the Tarawa Expeditionary

Strike Group (ESG-1), to head the Combined Joint Task Force. Within 48 hours, he

established Combined Disaster Assistance Center – Pakistan (CDAC-PAK), whose mission

was to conduct humanitarian assistance operations in support of the Government of

Pakistan.[24] CDAC-PAK, based in Islamabad, served as the link between United States and

Pakistani military commanders, and the hub for the U.S. relief effort.

Rugged terrain, cold weather, and damaged infrastructure hindered the delivery of

humanitarian relief. Focusing on immediate humanitarian needs, the U.S. military provided

emergency shelter, relief supplies, and medical help in close coordination with the Pakistani

government, local authorities, and international organizations.[25] The effort included 1,200

service members and 24 helicopters operating specifically in support of the Pakistani military.[26] Military personnel from 19 other countries joined the effort and the NATO Response Force (NRF) established an air bridge for movement of supplies that deployed 1,200 personnel from 17 NATO countries.[27]

UN and NGO entities contributed a significant portion of relief operations, communicating with the Pakistani military through its quickly established Federal Relief Commission (FRC), an ad-hoc organization which coordinated the deployment of 60,000 Pakistani troops as well as foreign military, UN personnel, and more than 200 NGO operations.[28] In a report on the relief effort prepared for USCENTCOM, the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance said, "The Pakistani military played a central and effective role in the coordination of the relief effort, despite significant logistical challenges and the absence of an effective, pre-existing federal disaster management structure or coordinating agency."[29] Andrew McLeod, Chief of Operations for the UN Coordination Center during the relief effort, viewed the Pakistani military with caution, characterizing it as "lacking experience in working with NGOs and unfamiliar with humanitarian principles they defend. It was thus necessary…to use a model of non-interfering coordination in which the military shared an open and honest assessment of needs with the humanitarian community and allowed NGOs to choose what operations they would undertake and where. In this model, gaps in humanitarian delivery [were] back-filled by the army and government agencies." [30]

The timing of the earthquake, just before winter conditions moved into the region, meant that roads and rail lines remained impassable until spring. The unique heavy lift capability of U.S. Army CH-47 Chinooks diverted to Pakistan from operations in neighboring Afghanistan were the primary means of moving supplies to the remote areas cut

off by damage from the earthquake. USAID described the Chinook's impact: "Since U.S. choppers have twice the lifting power and can haul slings without landing or hand loading, the U.S. military delivered the lion's share of the aid."[31] In contrast, the UN rented Mi-8 Hips from Ukraine, which were capable of carrying half the weight Chinooks could carry.[32] U.S. military support to Operation Lifeline continued until early April 2006, six months after the first Chinook landed in Pakistan, becoming the longest relief operation in American history.[33]

Command and Control

Both Operation Unified Assistance and Operation Lifeline demonstrate highly effective use of U.S. military forces in sudden-onset disaster relief missions. Post-mission articles and summaries are rife with statistics describing the amount of supplies delivered, water produced and delivered, patients treated, and missions flown. The numbers are staggering and would not have been possible without employing the robust logistical capabilities of the U.S. and coalition militaries. Quantity of relief supplies delivered, however, is primarily a measure of performance that does not demonstrate mission success. Food, water, and medicine delivered to a disaster location, but not distributed to those in need is useless. During disaster relief efforts, access, coverage, and capacity building serve as measures of effectiveness, and are enabled by information sharing between relief providers.[34] Cossa states, "While the numbers of forces dedicated to the relief effort and the extent of aid they provided were impressive, the most invaluable U.S. contribution [to tsunami relief] focused around another Defense Department unique capability: command, control, communications, and coordination. These attributes, critical in wartime, proved equally critical in ensuring an effective, coordinated response."[35]

During HA missions, command and control (C2) of military assets at the operational level remains similar to traditional military operations; JTF command architecture and its inherent relationships are employed in similar manner to combat operations, despite name and acronym changes to account for the nature of the actual mission. Staffs and command structure are scaled depending on circumstances, with emphasis placed on civil affairs, logistics, medical, and public affairs functions. CFAC-PAK staff, originally derived from ESG-1 staff, grew from 10 personnel to over 100 during the first two weeks of Operation Lifeline.[36] Support for the staff arrived from the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) team, including a Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE) to coordinate strategic communications for the operation. Rear Admiral Lefever praised the added capacity: "JPASE's efforts dramatically improved public opinion toward the U.S. I wish I had that capability with me on the first day…"[37]

Information flow, both vertical and horizontal, remains one of the greatest challenges during HA missions. Unlike combat operations, military information systems, when used during relief operations, can serve as a boundary to effective coordination with non-military entities because of classification and network limitations. Informal communications, such as verbal requests, are often the only available means for getting things done. During tsunami relief, NGO personnel would simply walk up to U.S. Navy helicopter pilots and ask for their help to move supplies where they were needed, which the pilots would accommodate if possible.[38] While occasionally effective at the tactical level, this ad-hoc method is not efficient enough at the operational level to enable valuable but short-duration participation of military forces sought by all parties in these types of disasters.

Web-enabled communication solutions can be effective if they reside on accessible servers and are updated regularly. During OUA, PACOM's Asia Pacific Area Network

(APAN) was widely used to share unclassified information by Britain, Canada, Australia and the affected Asian nations while coordinating relief efforts.[39] It is a non .mil web portal (www1.apan-info.net) hosted by PACOM to serve as a collaboration tool for all entities involved in theater security cooperation, multinational workshops and exercises, and crisis/contingency response operations.[40] Previously established for use during military planning and training exercises, its simplicity and accessibility made it vital to daily operations at the CCC.

In the field, however, it is unlikely that consistently reliable communications will be available. Given the state of technology today, voice connectivity is probable, but efficient connectivity relies on broader information sharing and collaboration assets that web access and email provide. The UN Disaster Assessment Coordination (UNDAC) team, a relatively well-funded team of disaster management professionals, deployed to Indonesia during tsunami relief in 2004 with nothing but satellite telephones. As a coordinating body, they endeavor to provide the capability to set up efficient communications system to tie the various relief organizations together. Their lack of equipment and technical support resulted in a six-week delay before Internet access was established across Aceh.[41]

Civil-Military Coordination

Coordination requirements for U.S. military personnel participating in HA missions generally fall into four categories: military-to-military, inter-agency (within the USG), IOs (such as UN), and NGOs. At the root of coordination challenges are cultural and procedural differences, which are exacerbated by unfamiliarity with established practices, especially in the civil-military category. Without discounting the significant challenges inherent in working with *all* of the listed entities, coordinating with NGOs presents the greatest

challenge for both cultural and procedural reasons. In an article on civil-military

coordination written by De Brouwer, Isbell, and Petrovski, three UN specialists with

significant field experience, they explained the different perspectives:

> The military and humanitarian organizations are often seen as strange bedfellows.
> With their vastly different cultures and core missions–one the application of force in
> the pursuit of defence [sic] of national interests, the other humanitarian relief often in
> situations where the presence of militaries is a complicating factor–each has
> historically viewed the other with at least suspicion.[42]

NGOs are aware that the military excels in providing immediate assistance, saving lives and

relieving suffering, but that understanding is tempered by their doubt of the military's

commitment to humanitarian principles.[43]

Common objectives should facilitate increased cooperation between the military and

NGOs. The core mission of NGOs, humanitarian relief, is also in the national interest of the

United States. It is a key component of the 2007 Maritime Strategy: "…we will continue to

mitigate human suffering as the vanguard of interagency and multinational efforts… Human

suffering moves us to act…and to provide assistance."[44] Commanders of HA missions strive

to translate these common objectives into unity of effort as they develop integration

strategies with NGO participants.   In order to achieve this end, it must be recognized that

each relief organization may have unique and competing goals relative to each other, are

funded at vastly different levels by their sponsors, and harbor varying degrees of resistance to

cooperating with the military for fear of losing their shroud of impartiality, if not neutrality.

The UN attempts to facilitate civil-military coordination (CMCoord) through two

mechanisms, the UN Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC) and the Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The mandate of the UNJLC is to coordinate logistics

capabilities of participating agencies and militaries during large-scale emergencies.[45]

DeBrouwer, Isbell and Petrovski, all UNJLC veterans, explain that the "frequent use of

retired military staff, including field grade or general officers, as CMCoord…officers also

means that, in many instances, there is solid, first-hand military knowledge backed by

previously-established military relationships and networks — valuable tools for coordinating

two very different types of entities with very different styles of management."[46] OCHA,

through its Civil-Military Coordination Section, states on its website that it facilitates "the

essential dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian

emergencies that is necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid

competition, minimise [sic] inconsistency, and when appropriate pursue common goals.

Basis strategies range from coexistence to cooperation with the military, with a strong

emphasis attached to coordination as a shared responsibility."[47] These agencies will likely

have a presence in large-scale disaster relief efforts, both at the JTF and combatant

commander level. During OUA, for example, a UNJLC CMCoord officer was embedded at

PACOM. According to De Brouwer, Isbell, and Petrovski, "his specialized knowledge of

the tsunami mission and influence with PACOM…led to improved mutual understanding,

engagement, and coordination of relief assistance among PACOM, the UN, and other aid

agencies, and ultimately furthered their combined relief efforts."[48]

Embedding of NGO and UN representatives is necessary at the theater-strategic level

and essential at the operational-tactical level during HA missions. Joint doctrine describes

the different types of operations centers that may be created to aid CMCoord:

> A combatant commander may establish an HA coordination center to assist with early
> interagency coordination and planning and to provide a link between the command
> and other governmental and nongovernmental agencies that may be participating in
> the operation at the theater strategic level... The humanitarian operations center
> (HOC), normally established by the UN or a relief agency, coordinates the overall
> relief strategy; identifies logistic requirements for NGOs, the UN, and IOs; and
> identifies, prioritizes, and submits requests for military support to a JTF through a
> civil-military operations center (CMOC) in cases where these organizations have
> been established. The HOC is primarily an interagency policymaking and

coordinating body that does not exercise command and control but seeks to achieve unity of effort.[49]

In the absence of reliable information systems, these centers provide common ground for meetings that will be necessary, albeit painful, to synchronize relief activities. Military personnel will likely be frustrated by the ad-hoc nature of inter-organization coordination that exists in the world of NGOs. During tsunami relief, NGOs complained about the quantity and quality of inter-relief organization coordination meetings. Without clarity on the objectives of so many meetings, junior staff members were sent as representatives, but without the authority to make decisions. The lack of consensus that resulted caused decreased efficiency, the exact opposite of the intended purpose for the meetings.[50] Thus the role of the Liaison Officer (LNO) is just as critical in HA as it is in combat operations. In addition to the command and control functions of these coordination centers, they facilitate face-to-face interaction between personnel and can help bridge the cultural and language barriers that will inevitably exist.

Looking Forward

The experience gained in recent large-scale HA/DR missions, coupled with the civil-military experiences of Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan must be exploited when developing plans for future operations. The UN, through its Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), strives to develop a doctrine-like set of guidelines for UN and NGO participants in humanitarian relief, gathering lessons learned from these experiences and applying them to policy development.[51] For the military's part, doctrine development in this area continues, but will not be enough. The individuals involved in these missions, from the JTF commander, to the helicopter pilot delivering supplies, to the young Marine handing out

bottles of water or providing security for civilians, must receive training on the civil-military coordination issues that will arise. Exercises, such as Cobra Gold[52], provide excellent opportunities to accomplish multinational and inter-agency training, and are necessary in all theaters.

Awareness that all NGOs are not alike, that they have varied perspectives on military participation in HA/DR, disparate resources and capabilities, and different objectives for their participation will help military commanders understand where challenges will arise. Effective coordination and operations centers that provide access for representatives of all agencies, and connectivity to activities in the field remain the most effective means of achieving objectives. UN and affected country representatives, as long-term players in the mission, must assume a lead role in the coordinating efforts and meetings that will occur at the operations center, with military representatives able to speak authoritatively on resource allocation and limitations. A supporting role for the U.S. military should be the primary focus throughout, enabled by robust communications inherent to military platforms. The systems should be shared with other participants, to the maximum extent possible, until their capabilities are up and running.

At the combatant commander level, sharing of lessons learned between agencies and NGOs is required to ensure the unique perspectives of each organization are considered in planning. Easily accessible, web-enabled concepts, such as APAN, not only allow robust collaboration during the crisis but also can provide common ground for posting, editing, and sharing of lessons learned after the mission is complete. To ensure these lessons are truly learned and not just observed, inclusion of experienced NGO and UN personnel in planning and exercises would be beneficial. The command structure being developed for U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), which incorporates greater numbers of personnel from DOS,

USAID, and other USG agencies, strives to exploit the knowledge of these non-military actors in its planning processes. It may serve as a model for the other combatant commands as civil-military cooperation becomes even more necessary in the achievement of theater-security goals.

Future JTF commanders and staffs involved in HA/DR missions will easily recognize the overwhelming superiority of their forces' logistical and C2 capacity when compared to other participants. It may be tempting to take a dominant role in the mission at both the operational and tactical level, but the role must remain one of support to USAID and the affected nation(s). The focus, even in early stages of the mission, must be on building capacity and access for the IOs and NGOs that will remain involved, in order to expeditiously hand over responsibility for sustained relief operations that do not favor large-scale military involvement. The model utilized by the commanders of Operation Unified Assistance and Operation Lifeline – Pakistan, as a first-responder employing robust capabilities until affected nations and relief organizations are no longer overwhelmed, should be maintained in future missions. The forward posture maintained by our deployed forces means they will be in position to assume that role.

If recent experience holds true, HA/DR missions will continue to expand in the near future. It is projected in the 2007 Maritime Strategy that "the effects of climate change may also amplify human suffering through catastrophic storms, loss of arable lands, and coastal flooding, could lead to loss of life, involuntary migration, social instability, and regional crises."[53] In order to attain our strategic security objectives in this future environment, and in light of post-conflict experience in the Global War on Terror, our performance alongside international and inter-agency partners is critical. While dominance in the application of

hard power remains vital, the nuanced application of the soft power capabilities of our

military is equally imperative.

NOTES

[1] Tony Zinni, "Military Diplomacy," in *Shaping the Security Environment*, Newport Papers no. 29, ed. Derek S. Reveron (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, September 2007), 40.

[2] Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.6 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 15 August 2001), II-1, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jpoperationsseriespubs.htm (accessed 4 April 2008).

[3] Ibid, GL-5.

[4] Ibid.

[5] USAID, "This is USAID," http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/ (accessed 5 April 2008).

[6] CJCS, *Joint TTP for FHA,* JP 3-07.6, I-2.

[7] Ibid, II-3.

[8] Ibid.

[9] USAID, "USG Partners in Providing Humanitarian Assistance," http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/partners/ (accessed 15 April 2008).

[10] U.S. Pacific Command, "Operation Unified Assistance," PowerPoint, 15 April 2005, slide 16, http://www.pacom.mil/special/0412asia/index.shtml (accessed 4 April 2008).

[11] Ibid, slide 10.

[12] Ibid.

[13] U.S. Pacific Command, "PACOM Lessons Learned – Op Unified Assistance," PowerPoint, 16 April 2006.

[14] Ralph A. Cossa, "U.S. Military Provides 'Logistical Backbone' for Tsunami Relief," *eJournal USA: Foreign Policy Agenda 9*, no. 3 (update March 2005), http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1104/ijpe/cossa.htm (accessed 5 April 2008).

[15] Bruce Elleman, *Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy's Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia*, Newport Papers no. 28 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, February 2007), 63.

[16] Robert R. Blackman, "DoD Briefing on Operation Unified Assistance, the Post-Tsunami Relief Effort," Press Briefing, Utapao, Thailand, 7 January 2005, http://www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2005/050107tsunami.shtml (accessed 4 April 2008).

[17] Cossa, "U.S. Military Provides 'Logistical Backbone' for Tsunami Relief."

[18] U.S. Pacific Command to commanding general, Combined Support Force 536, message 061800Z JAN 05, 6 January 2005.

[19] Blackman, "DoD Briefing on Operation Unified Assistance."

[20] Elleman, *Waves of Hope*, 89.

[21] PACOM, "Operation Unified Assistance," slide 15.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Blackman, "DoD Briefing on Operation Unified Assistance."

[24] U.N. Joint Logistics Center, "UNJLC Pakistan Earthquake Bulletin no. 8," 26 October 2005, http://www.unjlc.org/23003/pakistan/bulletins/unjlcarticle.2005-11-02.8378172574 (accessed 6 April 2008).

[25] USAID, "Pakistan Quake Relief," May 2006, 6, http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/documents/south_asia_quake/pakistan_quakerelief.pdf (accessed 6 April 2008).

[26] Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, "Pakistan Earthquake: A Review of the Civil-Military Dimensions of the International Response," April 2006, 1, http://www.centcom-hdm.org/uploadedfiles/guidance/Guidance/PAK%20AAR%20report%20-FINAL%20REPORT(2).pdf (accessed 6 April 2008).

[27] Ibid, 2.

[28] Ibid, 1.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Andrew MacLeod, "Early Recovery From Disaster: The Pakistan Earthquake," *Forced Migration Review 29* (December 2007), 38, http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR29/FMR29.pdf (accessed 6 April 2008).

[31] USAID, "Pakistan Quake Relief," May 2006, 7.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Dennis Lynn, "Strategic Communication and the Diplomacy of Deeds," in *Shaping the Security Environment*, Newport Papers no. 29, ed. Derek S. Reveron (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, September 2007), 88.

[34] Eugene V. Bonventure, "Monitoring and Evaluation of Department of Defense Humanitarian Assistance Programs," *Military Review 88,* no. 1, Jan-Feb 2008, 68, http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JanFeb08/BonventreEngJanFeb08.pdf (accessed 25 March 2008).

[35] Cossa, "U.S. Military Provides 'Logistical Backbone' for Tsunami Relief."

[36] Mike LeFever, "The Future is Today: Operation Lifeline (Disaster Assistance Center – Pakistan)," PowerPoint, 30 April 2006, slide 8, under "Plenary Sessions," http://www.nps.edu/Academics/GSBPP/NavyWorkshopConference.html (accessed 6 April 2008).

[37] Chris Shepherd, "U.S. Joint Forces Command: Joint Enabling Capabilities," PowerPoint, 31 July 2007, slide 7-9, http://www.ndia-ghrc.org/Symposium_2007/Briefs/Breakouts.asp (accessed 6 April 2008).

[38] Elleman, *Waves of Hope*, 73.

[39] Cossa, "U.S. Military Provides 'Logistical Backbone' for Tsunami Relief."

[40] U.S. Pacific Command, "APAN/MPAT", PowerPoint, slide 2, under "Capabilities," http://www1.apan-info.net/APANHome/AboutUs/tabid/4621/Default.aspx (accessed 4 April 2008).

[41] Jon Bennett, Clare Harkin, and Stanley Samarasinghe, "Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Coordination of International Humanitarian Assistance in Tsunami-affected Countries: Evaluation Findings – Indonesia," 10, http://www.tsunami-evaluation.org/NR/rdonlyres/332CA684-298E-4A6F-9896-D4897340F99F/0/coordination_indonesia.pdf (accessed 4 April 2008).

[42] Wilfried de Brouwer, Brian Isbell, and Elizabeth Petrovski, "Civil-Military Coordination from a United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) Perspective," *Liaison 3*, no. 3, 2006, http://www.coe-dmha.org/Liaison/Vol_3No_3/index.htm (accessed 6 April 2008).

[43] Bennett, Harkin, and Samarasinghe, "Coordination of International Humanitarian Assistance," 22.

[44] Chief of Naval Operations, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, (Washington, DC: CNO, October 2007), 11.

[45] UN Joint Logistics Center, "What is UNJLC?" http://www.unjlc.org/about/ (accessed 7 April 2008).

[46] De Brouwer, Isbell, and Petrovski, "Civil-Military Coordination."

[47] UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Civil Military Coordination Section," http://ochaonline.un.org/AboutOCHA/Organigramme/EmergencyServicesBranchESB/Civil MilitaryCoordinationSection/tabid/1274/Default.aspx (accessed 7 April 2008).

[48] De Brouwer, Isbell, and Petrovski, "Civil-Military Coordination."

[49] CJCS, *Joint TTP for FHA,* JP 3-07.6, ix.

[50] Bennett, Harkin, and Samarasinghe, "Coordination of International Humanitarian Assistance," 18.

[51] UN IASC, "About the Inter-Agency Standing Committee," http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/content/about/default.asp (accessed 18 April 2008).

[52] Cobra Gold is an annual multinational exercise held in Thailand that emphasizes combined-joint interoperability during peace operations. 2007 participants included Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, Thailand and the U.S. The Cobra Gold website is hosted on APAN at http://www1.apan-info.net/cobragold.

[53] Chief of Naval Operations, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, 4.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bennett, John, Clare Harkin, and Stanley Samarashinghe. "Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: Coordination of International Humanitarian Assistance in Tsunami-affected Countries: Evaluation Findings – Indonesia." http://www.tsunami-evaluation.org/NR/rdonlyres/332CA684-298E-4A6F-9896-D4897340F99F/0/coordination_indonesia.pdf (accessed 4 April 2008).

Blackman, Robert R. "DoD Briefing on Operation Unified Assistance, the Post-Tsunami Relief Effort." Press Briefing. Utapao, Thailand, 7 January 2005. http://www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2005/050107tsunami.shtml (accessed 4 April 2008).

Bonaventure, Eugene V. "Monitoring and Evaluation of Department of Defense Humanitarian Assistance Programs." *Military Review 88*, no.1, Jan-Feb 2008. http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JanFeb08/BonventreEngJanFeb08.pdf (accessed 25 March 2008).

Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance. "Pakistan Earthquake: A Review of the Civil-Military Dimensions of the International Response." April 2006. http://www.centcom-hdm.org/uploadedfiles/guidance/Guidance/PAK%20AAR%20report%20-FINAL%20REPORT(2).pdf (accessed 6 April 2008).

Cossa, Ralph A. "U.S. Military Provides 'Logistical Backbone' for Tsunami Relief." *Ejournal USA: Foreign Policy Agenda 9* no. 3, update March 2005. http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1104/ijpe/cossa.htm (accessed 5 April 2008).

De Brouwer, Wilfried, Brian Isbell, and Elizabeth Petrovski. "Civil-Military Coordination from a United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) Perspective." *Liaison 3* no. 3, 2006. http://www.coe-dmha.org/Liaison/Vol_3No_3/index.htm (accessed 6 April 2008).

Elleman, Bruce. *Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy's Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia*. Newport Papers no. 28. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, February 2007.

Lefever, Mike. "The Future is Today: Operation Lifeline (Disaster Assistance Center – Pakistan)." PowerPoint, 30 April 2006. Under "Plenary Sessions." http://www.nps.edu/Academics/GSBPP/NavyWorkshopConference.html (accessed 6 April 2008).

Lynn, Dennis. "Strategic Communication and the Diplomac of Deeds." In *Shaping the Security Environment*. Newport Papers no. 29, edited by Derek S. Reveron, 87-100. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, September 2007.

MacLeod, Andrew. "Early Recovery From Disaster: The Pakistan Earthquake." *Forced Migration Review 29*, December 2007, 38-39. http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR29/FMR29.pdf (accessed 6 April 2008).

Shepherd, Chris. "U.S. Joint Forces Command: Joint Enabling Capabilities." PowerPoint, 31 July 2007. http://www.ndia-ghrc.org/Symposium_2007/Briefs/Breakouts.asp (accessed 6 April 2008).

UN IASC. "About the Inter-Agency Standing Committee." United Nations. http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/content/about/default.asp (accessed 18 April 2008).

UN Joint Logistics Center. "What is UNJLC?" United Nations. http://www.unjlc.org/about (accessed 7 April 2008).

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. "Civil Military Coordination Section." United Nations. http://ochaonline.un.org/AboutOCHA/Organigramme/EmergencyServicesBranchESB/CivilMilitaryCoordinationSection/tabid/1274/Default.aspx (accessed 7 April 2008).

USAID. "Pakistan Quake Relief." May 2006. http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/documents/south_asia_quake/pakistan_quakerelief.pdf (accessed 6 April 2008).

USAID. "This Is USAID." http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/ (accessed 5 April 2008).

USAID. "USG Partners in Providing Humanitarian Assistance." http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/partners/ (accessed 15 April 2008).

U.S. Pacific Command. "APAN/MPAT." PowerPoint. Under "Capabilities." http://www1.apan-info.net/APANHome/AboutUs/tabid/4621/Default.aspx (accessed 4 April 2008).

U.S. Navy. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.* Washington, DC: CNO, October 2007.

U.S. Pacific Command. "Operation Unified Assistance." PowerPoint, 15 April 2005. http://www.pacom.mil/special/0412asia/index.shtml (accessed 4 April 2008).

U.S. Pacific Command. "PACOM Lessons Learned – Op Unified Assistance." PowerPoint, 16 April 2006.

U.S. Pacific Command. To commanding general, Combined Support Force 536. Message. 061800Z JAN 05. 6 January 2005.

U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.* Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.6. Washington, DC: CJCS, 15 August 2001. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jpoperationsseriespubs.htm (accessed 4 April 2008).

Zinni, Tony. "Military Diplomacy." In *Shaping the Security Environment*, Newport Papers no. 29, edited by Derek S. Reveron, 23-41. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, September 2007.